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Abstract 
Traditional capital structure theory in frictionless and efficient markets predicts that reducing 
banks’ leverage reduces the risk and cost of equity but does not change the overall weighted 
average cost of capital (and thus the rates for borrowers). We test these two predictions. We 
confirm that the equity of better-capitalized banks has lower beta and idiosyncratic risk. 
However, over the last 40 years, lower risk banks have higher stock returns on a risk-adjusted or 
even a raw basis, consistent with a stock market anomaly previously documented in other 
samples. The size of the low risk anomaly within banks suggests that the cost of capital effects of 
capital requirements is large enough to be relevant to policy discussions. A calibration assuming 
competitive lending markets suggests that a binding ten percentage-point increase in Tier 1 
capital to risk-weighted assets more than doubles banks’ average risk premium over Treasury 
yields, from 40 to between 100 and 130 basis points per year, and presumably raises rates for 
borrowers to a similar extent. 
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I. Introduction 
The instability of banks in the financial crisis has reignited debates about capital 
requirements. The issue is multidimensional, involving agency problems in banks, asymmetric 
information, international coordination and arbitrage, bank governance, tax benefits of debt, 
government subsidies, systemic risks and externalities beyond the financial sector, shadow 
banking, political pressures and regulatory capture, private versus social costs, and so on. But 
one of the ongoing concerns has been that capital requirements might affect banks’ overall cost 
of capital, and therefore lending rates and economic activity.2 
Many bankers appear to prefer lower capital requirements. They argue that because 
equity is more expensive than debt, more of it clearly raises the overall cost of capital. For 
example, according to a former managing director of JP Morgan turned policy analyst, “the first-
order effect of increasing the ratio of common equity to total assets for banks from 5% to 30% 
would clearly be very high. Assume that the annual cost of bank equity is 5 percentage points 
higher than the after-tax cost of bank deposits and debt…” (Elliott (2013)). The CEO of 
Deutsche Bank states that heightened capital requirements “would restrict [banks’] ability to 
provide loans to the rest of the economy. This reduces growth and has negative effects for all” 
(Admati and Hellwig (2013), p. 5). 
Economists, on the other hand, often view this argument as a fallacy. The textbook 
Modigliani-Miller logic is articulated by, for example, Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig, and 
Pfleiderer (2011): “[B]ecause the increase in capital provides downside protection that reduces 
shareholders’ risk, shareholders will require a lower expected return to invest in a better 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 See Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard (1994), Philippon (2009), Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012) and citations therein 
for evidence on the effect of costs of capital on business investment. Broader studies of the real effects of bank 
capital requirements include Van den Heuvel (2008), Macroeconomic Assessment Group of the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (2010), Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010), Elliott (2009, 2010), and Santos and 
Elliott (2012).  
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capitalized bank” (p. 16, italics in original). In an efficient and integrated capital market—absent 
taxes and other distortions—the reduced cost of equity offsets its increased weight in the capital 
structure and leaves the overall cost of capital unchanged. Admati and Hellwig (2013) maintain 
that the considerable social benefits of capital requirements suggest raising the minimum equity 
to assets ratio to between 20% and 30% from its current single digits.  
Real capital markets contain frictions and inefficiencies that challenge the Modigliani-
Miller assumptions, however, so the relevance of the frictionless-irrelevance argument is not so 
clear. Many of these frictions have been studied, but there has been surprisingly little direct 
evidence on the basic proposition that reduced leverage reduces the cost of equity. In this paper, 
we study empirically how leverage has related to the risk and cost of bank equity and, in turn, to 
the overall cost of capital. 
We are especially motivated by the possible interaction of capital requirements and the 
“low risk anomaly” within the stock market. That is, while stocks have on average earned higher 
returns than less risky asset classes like corporate bonds, which in turn have earned more than 
Treasury bonds, recent research emphasizes that the basic risk-return relationship within the 
stock market has historically been flat, if not inverted. Haugen and Heins (1975), Fama and 
French (1992), Baker, Bradley, and Wurgler (2011), and Baker, Bradley, and Taliaferro (2013) 
find a flat or negative relationship between a stock’s systematic risk, as measured by its stock 
market beta, and its subsequent returns. Ang, Hodrick, Ying, and Zhang (2006, 2009) find a 
negative relationship between idiosyncratic risk and returns in the U.S. and many international 
stock markets. We review the growing literature on how a combination of behavioral investing 
patterns and limits on arbitrage might drive these patterns.  
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These studies suggest that there is a low risk anomaly on average within the stock market. 
The relevant question for capital requirements is whether this holds within banks specifically. 
Does the cost of equity fall with equity as Modigliani-Miller predicts? Or does it not fall by 
enough, or actually increase, as bankers and the low risk anomaly imply? Indeed, the low risk 
anomaly might not be present in banks at all. Relative to nonfinancial firms, their financial 
structure and risks are tracked in far greater detail by regulators and investors.  
We use a large sample of historical U.S. data and proceed to test the two steps in the 
traditional argument.  First, we relate bank equity betas estimated from CRSP to leverage ratios 
from quarterly reports.  Second, we relate realized returns on equity to bank equity betas. We 
also replace beta with idiosyncratic risk. The two steps together then allow us to calibrate the 
effect of increased capital requirements on the cost of equity and, under certain assumptions, the 
overall cost of capital. We reach similar conclusions when we relate capital to returns directly 
over the sample with good data on risk-adjusted capital ratios. 
We confirm that bank equity risk is sharply increasing in leverage. This is not surprising, 
and our work here extends that of Kashyap, Stein, and Hanson (2010). When capital is measured 
by the Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets ratio, the portfolio beta of the least-capitalized banks 
is 0.93 while the portfolio beta of the most-capitalized banks is 0.50. Higher capital ratios also 
predict lower idiosyncratic risk. Even this relatively large difference in beta is attenuated by two 
factors. Banks with riskier assets may choose to have larger capital cushions. This endogenous 
selection reduces the slope between beta and observed capital ratios. Indeed, within the largest 
banks, where the asset mix also includes investment banking, asset management, and other 
operations, the difference is smaller and less robust. Also, to the extent that debt is risky, some of 
the asset risk is borne by debt and not equity for the most leveraged banks. This type of risk 
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sharing between debt and equity also flattens the empirical relationship. Yet it remains so strong 
that it is safe to conclude that leverage increases the risk of equity—which, of course, is 
theoretically required. 
Does a reduction in beta translate to a reduction in the cost of equity? The answer from 
40 years of U.S. stock returns is no. The low risk anomaly is actually a bit stronger within banks 
than other firms. High-beta banks returned less than low-beta banks, even on a raw basis, and 
even in a period of mostly rising equity markets. Value-weighted returns are, on average, 16 
basis points per month higher for a portfolio of the lowest three beta deciles than for a portfolio 
of the highest three beta deciles. The spread between low and high idiosyncratic risk portfolios is 
6 basis points per month. These effects are not mediated by capitalization. Controlling for a size 
factor increases the risk-adjusted differences, especially for idiosyncratic risk portfolios. More 
simply, beta is positively correlated with capitalization while idiosyncratic risk is negatively 
correlated, yet both risk types are negatively related to average returns.  
We focus on the last 40 years of data because earlier stock returns data include only a 
small number of banks, rendering portfolio returns much less diversified and conclusions more 
tenuous. Nonetheless, results using the last 80 years of data are at least as strong. The empirical 
conclusion is that high-risk U.S. banks, like high-risk nonfinancial firms in the U.S. and other 
developed markets, have delivered equal or lower returns to shareholders than low-risk banks.  
The last requirement for the low risk anomaly to affect the overall cost of capital 
concerns debt and equity market integration. If debt markets exhibit the same anomaly to the 
same degree, then capital structure remains irrelevant. Our own back-of-the-envelope 
calculations, as well as prior work, indicate that this is not the case. The low-risk anomaly is 
strongest in the stock market.  
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Putting the pieces together, the data suggest that more conservative capital structures 
reduce the risk of equity but may increase its cost, and the overall cost of capital, by bringing the 
low risk anomaly into play. To assess magnitudes, we focus on the beta anomaly and estimate 
how the overall cost of capital for a bank would have changed over this period given the 
hypothetical ten percentage-point increase in Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets experiment in 
Kashyap et al. (2010). A benchmark estimate of the pretax weighted average cost of capital for a 
typical bank implied by the Capital Asset Pricing Model over our sample period is 40 basis 
points per year above the risk-free rate. By reducing equity betas, banks with a full ten 
percentage point increase in Tier 1 capital would have added between 60 and 90 basis points to 
this spread, which would more than double the weighted average cost of capital over the risk-free 
rate to between 100 and 130 basis points. In a competitive lending market this would have 
translated to a similar increase in rates faced by borrowers. We examine the sensitivity of this 
calibration to assumptions about risky debt, the extent of a low risk anomaly in debt markets, and 
government insurance of bank debt. We find that the baseline calibration with riskless debt 
remains a reasonable estimate in the presence of such factors.  
To summarize, our evidence suggests that the low risk anomaly may cause the cost of 
capital for banks to increase with capital requirements. It is separate from and presumably 
additive to other (private) costs of capital effects such as the lost tax benefits of debt (Kashyap et 
al. (2010)), reduced government subsidies, or foregone deposits made “cheap” as a result of their 
liquidity services (Allen and Carletti (2013), DeAngelo and Stulz (2013)). In the end, when all 
social and private benefits and costs are tallied, significantly increased capital requirements may 
well be desirable; our evidence suggests that one effect on the cost of capital, however, has been 
neglected and should be added to the debate. 
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Section II gives some background on the low risk anomaly.  Section III describes stock 
returns and capital adequacy data.  Section IV studies the connections between beta, capital 
levels, and costs of equity.  Section V summarizes regulatory epochs and performs a calibration 
exercise. Section VI concludes with some tentative policy suggestions.  
 
II. The Low Risk Anomaly in the Stock Market 
Over the long run, riskier asset classes have earned higher returns in U.S. markets. From 
1926 to 2012, small capitalization stocks provided higher but more variable returns than large 
capitalization stocks, which in turn were riskier and returned more than long-term corporate 
bonds, and so on down the list of increasingly safer asset classes of long-term Treasury bonds, 
intermediate-term Treasury bonds, and Treasury bills (Ibbotson Associates (2012)).  
The historical risk-return tradeoff within the stock market is flat or inverted, however. 
The standard Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) predicts that the expected return on a security 
is proportional to its systematic risk (beta). Investors are assumed to diversify away idiosyncratic 
risk so it does not affect their required returns.  The “low risk anomaly” is the empirical pattern 
that stocks with higher beta, or higher idiosyncratic risk, have tended to earn lower returns.  
To a greater or lesser extent, this failure of the traditional risk-return tradeoff appears 
within stock markets around the world and across different sample periods. Black (1972), Black, 
Jensen, and Scholes (1972), Haugen and Heins (1975), and Fama and French (1992) all noted the 
relatively flat relationship between expected returns and beta risk. More recently, Ang, Hodrick, 
Ying, and Zhang (2006, 2009) have emphasized the magnitude and robustness of the anomaly. 
Ang et al. (2009) find that stocks with higher idiosyncratic risk earn statistically significantly 
lower returns in each of the G7 countries and across 23 developed markets. Blitz and van Vliet 
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(2007) and Baker, Bradley, and Taliaferro (2013) confirm the presence of the low risk anomaly 
within developed markets and Blitz, Pang, and van Vliet (2012) extend this to emerging markets. 
These patterns challenge not just the CAPM but any framework where risk and expected return 
are positively related.  
The magnitude of the risk-return inversion is substantial.  For example, Baker, Bradley, 
and Taliaferro (2013) find that a dollar invested in a low quintile beta portfolio of U.S. stocks in 
early 1968 grows to $70.50 by the end of 2011, a while dollar invested in a high beta portfolio 
grows to only $7.61. In a sample of up to 30 developed equity markets over a shorter period 
beginning in 1989, the comparable figures are $6.40 and $0.99. It is remarkable that a value-
weighted portfolio of high-risk quintile stocks held for four decades did not earn a positive return 
even in nominal terms.  
For our purposes, the precise origin of the low risk anomaly is not critical. What matters 
is whether it exists among banks and, if so, is likely to persist. Several explanations for the low 
risk anomaly have been put forth.  A variety of evidence suggests that some individual investors 
have an irrational preference for volatile or skewed investments, due to overconfidence, as in 
Cornell (2008), or lottery preferences, as in Kumar (2009), Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2011) 
and the cumulative prospect theory of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) as modeled by Barberis 
and Huang (2008). Leverage-constrained investors who pursue a strategy of seeking high returns 
from beta risk must invest in high-beta stocks directly, leading them to be overpriced relative to a 
leveraged position in low-beta stocks (Black (1972) and Frazzini and Pedersen (2013)).  
One question is why more sophisticated investors do not take advantage of the anomaly.  
Institutional fund managers may prefer high-beta assets themselves because the inflows to 
performing well are greater than the outflows to performing poorly (Karceski (2002)). Another 
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reason for a high-beta preference is when managers are rewarded for beating the market, which 
presumably has a positive risk premium, on a non-beta-adjusted basis (Brennan (1993) and 
Baker et al. (2011)). More generally, short-selling constraints inhibit sophisticated investors’ 
ability to exploit the overpricing of high-beta stocks (Hong and Sraer (2012)).  
Given that overconfidence and lottery preferences are intrinsic human attributes; that 
leverage and short-sale constraints are enduring features of the trading environment; that 
institutional investors and their incentives are becoming only more important over time; and that 
the low risk anomaly apparent within all-industry samples appears in long U.S. and international 
samples—it is reasonable to entertain the possibility that any low risk anomaly present within 
banks will persist. 
The low risk anomaly has parallel implications for investors and CFOs. Low risk stocks, 
at least with the benefit of hindsight, have been priced relatively cheaply, so their equity capital 
has been expensive. High risk stocks, by contrast, have been expensive, and the cost of equity for 
these firms has been comparatively low.  
One might ask why nonfinancial firms do not increase their leverage ratios further to take 
advantage of the low risk anomaly. It is unclear how the low leverage ratios of nonfinancial 
firms represents an optimal tradeoff between the tax benefits of interest and the costs of financial 
distress, much less an extra benefit of debt arising from the mispricing of low risk stocks.3 On 
the other hand, many low leverage firms—e.g. the stereotypical unprofitable technology firm—
start with a high asset beta or overall asset risk, so their equity is already quite risky. It is also 
undoubtedly true that many firms are simply unaware of an anomaly, which, like most others, 
becomes evident only in large samples and long time series.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 See Graham (2000) on the low leverage puzzle. The low risk anomaly suggests another source of profits from 
leveraged buyouts, if the equity of a low-leverage firm is made more valuable by increasing its risk.  
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For our purposes, we simply note that there is no low leverage puzzle within banks. Their 
high leverage is consistent with their typically low risk assets (Gornall and Strebulaev (2014)) 
and so, at least directionally, standard tradeoff theory. Indeed, Gropp and Heider (2010) find that 
most cross-sectional determinants of capital structure have similar effects on banks and 
nonbanks. Furthermore, they find no evidence to support the popular suggestion that deposit 
insurance encourages additional leverage.  
 
III. Data 
 We require data on stock returns, risk, and bank capital structure.  
 
A. Banks, Betas, and Returns 
Estimating the relationship between expected equity returns—alternatively, the required 
return on equity or the cost of equity—and beta requires both a long time series of returns and a 
large number of banks to provide breadth in beta.  Our main sample for the returns analysis 
includes almost 4,000 publicly traded banks or bank holding companies that make an appearance 
in over 40 years of returns data.  
We gather bank stock prices and returns data from January 1931 through December 2011 
from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) database.  We focus our attention on 
the second half of the sample, the most recent 40.5 years starting in July 1971. We save the full 
sample as a robustness check, because there are relatively few publicly traded banks in the early 
CRSP years, rendering the beta portfolios undiversified and highly volatile.4  We identify banks 
using the set of four-digit SIC codes suggested in Fama and French (1997) plus the three-digit 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 After July 1971, there are at least 70 firms in the sample. Prior to July 1971, there are between five and 69 banks, 
with an overall average of 22.  
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SIC code corresponding to bank holding companies.5 The primary sample includes bank-months 
for which we can compute a valid beta, with at least 24 monthly holding period return (CRSP: 
RET) observations, a valid market capitalization, with a nonmissing price (PRC) and shares 
outstanding (SHROUT) observation, and at least one holding period return following a valid 
beta.  Due to the return requirements, the bank-months we follow run from February 1970 
through December 2011.  
The main sample of banks is broken down by decade and SIC in Table 1.  Holding 
companies are the most numerous group, followed by savings institutions, commercial banks, 
state banks in the Federal Reserve System, national commercial banks, S&Ls, and national banks 
in the Federal Reserve System. A total of 3,952 banks appear at some point in our CRSP sample.  
Summary statistics for this sample are in Table 2.  The bank-month observations are 
divided by pre-ranking risk measures.  Pre-ranking beta is computed for each bank-month by 
regressing a minimum of 24 months and a maximum of 60 months of trailing holding period 
returns in excess of the riskless rate on the corresponding CRSP U.S. value-weighted market 
holding period returns (CRSP: VWRETD, also in excess of the riskless rate, and provided by 
Ken French). We also take the root mean squared error from these regressions as our measure of 
idiosyncratic risk. This pre-ranking beta is what we will use to rank banks when tracking 
subsequent returns.  We will consider forward (realized) betas and idiosyncratic risk as well 
when correlating beta and capital ratios.  
It is worth noting at the outset that bank betas on an equal weighted basis are relatively 
low. The overall median is only 0.67. There is also ample spread on pre-ranking equity beta 
among our bank sample. The mean pre-ranking beta among the bottom three deciles is 0.18 and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 We exclude a small number of firms included in Fama and French’s definition of banks: those with SIC 
classifications as Federal Reserve Banks, Foreign Banks, Functions Related to Deposit Banking, Nondepository 
Credit Institutions, Federal Credit Agencies, or FNMA. Including these firms has no effect on our results.  
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the mean among the top three deciles is 1.37. More importantly, we will see that this pre-ranking 
spread leads to differences in realized portfolio betas of approximately 0.6. Another important 
pattern from Table 2 is the correlations between risk measures and capitalization. Beta is higher 
for large banks, while idiosyncratic risk is lower. As we shall also see, the risk measures imply 
similar conclusions for leverage and returns, suggesting that the results are not being mediated 
by capitalization.  
In total, this broad sample contains up to 272,031 bank-months for our beta and returns 
analysis. We also use three control variables common in the analysis of the cross-section of stock 
returns; e.g. Fama and French (1992) and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). As suggested above, 
higher-beta banks tend to be larger market capitalization.  This is the opposite of the negative 
correlation between beta and market capitalization among nonfinancial firms. Bank holding 
companies may have units such as investment banking where profits are more correlated with the 
overall stock market. Also, smaller firms, with less geographic and product diversification, may 
choose less risky operations with endogenously higher capital. To the extent that the endogenous 
link is through idiosyncratic risks, not beta, this is a useful form of identification for us.  
We also compute book-to-market equity ratios. Book equity data are available for a 
subset of stocks from Compustat, sourced from Moody’s. We follow the definition of book 
equity from Ken French’s data library. Within each beta group there is skewness in book-to-
market; it will come as no surprise that some banks have seen the market value of their assets 
deteriorate faster than they were marked down.  The median ratio across beta groups is an 
identical 0.76.  Another control variable is return momentum, defined as usual as the total stock 
return over the prior twelve months excluding the most recent one.  
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Figure 1 shows the time series of the average betas in each quantile.  In an average year 
there is a spread of around 1.0 between the average beta in the top three deciles and the bottom 
three deciles.  The average CRSP market return over the riskless rate is 6% and the standard 
deviation is 18% over our sample period, suggesting meaningful dispersion in CAPM-based 
expected equity returns and very wide dispersion in market-driven realized returns.  There is a 
jump in the number of smaller banks in 1973, when Nasdaq-listed firms first appear in the CRSP 
database.  This influx of typically lower-beta banks brings down average betas significantly in 
the early years, to a range and spread that has remained fairly stable since the mid-1970s.  
 
B. Bank Capital 
We are able to gather capitalization data for a subset of the CRSP sample from the 
quarterly call reports data in the WRDS Bank Regulatory database.  We use the CRSP PERMCO 
to bank RSSID ID link table available from March 1996 through December 2010 that is provided 
by WRDS; we start at 1996 with the introduction of granular capital data. In cases of multiple 
RSSIDs per PERMCO, we aggregate RCFD data items across RSSIDs. An alternative approach 
that yields similar results (unreported) is to use the quarterly Compustat data items on capital 
adequacy for banks. Our overall coverage is slightly better using the aggregation of call reports. 
Finally, we merge CRSP PERMCOs to PERMNOs. 
We consider five common capital ratios to determine which measure of equity best lines 
up with equity beta. The ratio of total equity capital (RCFD3210) divided by average total assets 
(RCFD3368) is the simple shareholder equity ratio.  Tier 1 capital (RCFD8274, which is first 
available in March 1996) to average total assets is called the leverage ratio.  Total risk-based 
capital (RCFD3792) to assets puts the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital in the numerator. Tier 1 
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capital to total risk-weighted assets (RCFDa223) is the critical Tier 1 capital ratio.  Total risk-
based capital to total risk-weighted assets is called the total capital ratio.  Scaling by risk-
weighted assets helps to address the possibility that asset beta may differ across our sample.  
We distribute these quarterly capital data across relevant months to yield an intersection 
of 74,105 bank-months with the basic returns data set.  Table 3, Panel A, shows the distribution 
of these measures of bank capital.  The sample is divided each month into ten deciles of capital 
adequacy.  We report the median and market-capitalization weighted mean ratio within each 
decile.  In this somewhat heterogeneous sample of banking institutions, the average capital ratios 
in the highest decile are typically around twice those of the lowest decile. The highest spread 
appears in the ratio Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets, which over this period was widely 
regarded as the most important measure of capital by market participants. See the Appendix for 
capital structure data on the largest bank holding companies as of the end of 2011.  
 
IV. Analysis 
 We wish to study whether the combination of an exogenous increase in capital 
requirements and the low risk anomaly would increase the overall cost of capital for banks.  The 
first step is to ask whether heightened capital requirements would reduce equity risk for banks. 
The second is to ask whether the low risk anomaly holds within banks. In general, we focus on 
beta risk, where the Modigliani-Miller logic best applies, but also explore idiosyncratic risk. 
 
A. Predictions: Capital Adequacy, Beta, and Returns 
 In efficient capital markets, higher capital ratios will be associated with lower equity 
betas and lower equity returns, all else equal. Capital structure is endogenous, however, so we 
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cannot use the cross-sectional relationship between capital ratios and beta to measure the causal 
effect of an increase in capital requirements. These effects tend to attenuate the relationship 
between capital ratios and equity beta. So, if there is a meaningful difference between 
endogenously selected capital ratios and empirical equity betas, we can be comfortable that 
exogenous effects would be at least as large.  
 Figure 2 shows some basic predictions for how leverage affects equity betas. Writing the 
definition of asset beta as a weighted average of equity and debt betas, with e being the ratio of 
equity to total assets and the inverse of e leverage, and rearranging, yields 
( ) deaee !!! 111 ""= . (1) 
With approximately riskless debt, the last term drops out and the relationship between equity 
beta and leverage is linear with a slope of asset beta, as shown with the solid line in Figure 2.6  
The effect of risky debt is apparent at high leverage, where debt’s beta rises and causes equity’s 
beta to rise less than linearly, as indicated by the dashed line on the right-hand side of Figure 2.  
 When banks differ in their asset betas, endogenous leverage choice due to financial 
distress costs leads to an additional effect that flattens the predicted relationship between equity 
beta and leverage. Banks with high asset betas, and therefore high equity betas for any given 
leverage, will tend to choose lower leverage. Similarly, and reinforcing the risky debt effect, 
banks with low asset betas, and thus low equity betas for any given leverage, may choose higher 
leverage.7  To summarize, the dashed line in Figure 2 is what we would expect from this real-
world combination of risky debt and endogenous capital structure choice. The coefficient in a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 As a reminder, the weighted average of equity and debt betas equals asset beta by identity, in the same way that the 
beta of any portfolio is the weighted sum of the betas in the portfolio. The CAPM is not required for its validity. 
Also note that a debt tax shield do not alter this formula as long as the bank continuously rebalances its debt to 
maintain a constant debt to value ratio; the tax shield asset is as risky as the operating assets. 
7 We are obviously not developing a complete theory of bank versus nonbank capital structures. Many other 
frictions drive a wedge between their equilibrium behaviors. Our discussion is pertinent to behavior across banks. 
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regression of equity betas on inverse capital ratios is likely to be somewhat lower than the asset 
beta, particularly for extreme levels of leverage. 
 This discussion also suggests why we want to go from capital adequacy to returns in two 
steps—from capital to beta, and from beta to returns—as opposed to directly from capital to 
returns. As explained above, capital is endogenous in a way that may attenuate the results we are 
looking for: High capital firms tend to have riskier assets to start with. Critically, however, this 
endogenous selection of capital will be apparent in betas, i.e. an attenuated link between capital 
and beta. From a regulatory perspective we wish to understand the effect of an exogenous 
increase in capital requirements. In that case, beta will fall, and then we can use the beta effects 
to infer the ultimate effects of higher capital. The capital data therefore is in place to estimate a 
reasonable lower bound for the link between capital requirements and beta, and then we can use 
the returns data to get at the link between beta and returns.8 
Still, this leaves open the possibility that there is a low risk anomaly generally, but that 
there is no low risk anomaly with respect to explicit leverage decisions. In other words, the link 
between beta and returns is flat, only for variation in beta that is not induced by changes in 
leverage, or in the case of banks capital requirements. So, we also repeat our portfolio tests on 
capital sorted portfolios for the shorter window from 1996 through 2011 where we have risk-
weighted leverage data to work with. We defer this analysis until Table 9 below.  
 
B. Capital Adequacy and Beta 
 The channel that we are interested in is how equity affects beta. Table 3, Panel B, shows 
the relationship between capital measures and realized beta. The equal-weighted columns 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 A more practical constraint is that fifteen years of capital data are not enough for sufficiently reliable estimates of 
average returns on different risk categories of banks.  
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indicate that across all banks and for all capital measures, higher capital is associated with lower 
beta. We highlight the popular Tier 1 ratio, which generates the largest spread on beta as well as 
on capital. It is not surprising that the pure equity in the Tier 1 ratio (despite including some 
preferred equity) spreads beta better than other measures. Subordinated debt of the sort that is 
included in Tier 2, for example, provides a broader notion of capital but cannot reduce the beta 
of equity by nearly as much as more equity. Kashyap et al. (2010) focus on larger banks and use 
Computstat data on bank equity, and they document a relationship between beta and total equity 
to total assets. The more detailed breakdown afforded by the use of call reports data suggests that 
Tier 1 equity is by far the most important for spreading beta.  
The value-weighted differences in Panel B show that the link between beta and capital 
adequacy ratios is weaker for larger banks. It is precisely in these banks where one would expect 
the endogenous selection of leverage to be apparent, because the asset mix is much more 
variable. For example a bank with a high capital ratio might nonetheless have a high beta, 
because it derives more profit from higher beta activities like investment banking and brokerage. 
Still, the difference in realized beta as a function of the Tier 1 ratio is statistically and 
economically meaningful even in value-weighted terms. 
The significant spread in capital ratios suggests that some banks may not face binding 
leverage constraints, but this is misleading. We review actual regulatory requirements in the 
calibration, but note here that falling below regulatory minima subjects U.S. banks to Prompt 
Corrective Action restrictions, including ceasing dividends, filing and implementing a capital 
restoration plan, and prohibiting acceptance, renewal, or rolling-over of broker CDs. It may also 
force a return to the equity markets with an obvious lemons problem. Even falling below the 
higher standard of “well capitalized” triggers an increase in deposit insurance premia. Given the 
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consequences of falling short, the overwhelming majority of banks maintain a sizable buffer over 
the well-capitalized boundary, not just the regulatory minimum. The precise buffer presumably 
varies with asset risk, perceived access to the equity market, capital structure adjustment costs, 
and other factors.9 In short, it is difficult to know how much less than one-for-one leverage 
decreases with capital requirements, but they will most likely have some effect even on banks 
that are already well above heightened regulatory percentages.10  
To obtain a precise estimate of the linear relationship between forward (realized) beta and 
equity capital we can go beyond decile sorts. For idiosyncratic risk in particular, which cancels 
out in portfolios, we must look at the full cross section of beta and root mean squared error 
measured at the stock level. Table 4 shows regression results of forward beta and idiosyncratic 
risk on inverse equity capital, the specification suggested by equation (1), for all banks. We use 
the Fama-MacBeth (1973) procedure, which gives equal weight to each cross section, in the 
estimation, and we also use two-dimensional clustering, which corrects the standard errors of a 
single regression for correlated residuals for different time periods for the same firm or for 
different firms at a point in time. Figure 3 shows a third approach to tease out some of the 
nonlinear effects in Figure 2. These are kernel regressions of the same relationship for all banks 
and for banks only in the top half by market capitalization.  
Recall the discussion of the predictions in Figure 2. If variation in leverage were 
exogenous and debt were riskless, we would expect the slope in a regression of equity betas on 
inverse capital ratios to equal the average bank asset beta, and we would expect the intercept to 
be exactly zero. Both endogenous leverage choices and measurement error in capital cause the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
#!See Aiyar, Calomiris, and Wieladek (2012) for evidence based on the UK’s unique experiment where capital 
requirements were varied both across banks and over time. 
10 We are grateful to Sam Hanson for the discussion in this paragraph.  
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slope to be attenuated and the intercept to be positive. Consistent with measurement error, we 
find lower slopes for cruder measures of assets and equity capital. Consistent with the presence 
of endogenous leverage choices, the intercept is somewhat greater than zero even for the Tier 1 
to risk-weighted assets ratio and there is attenuation in the slope in Figure 3 for very low levels 
of leverage. A rough correction is to run this regression while forcing the intercept to be zero. 
This raises the lower bound estimate for asset beta to 0.074, which is the measured slope of the 
line in Panel A of Figure 3.  
This will be convenient for benchmarking in our calibration below. If bank assets have an 
inherent beta of 0.074 and the CAPM holds in frictionless capital markets, the pre-tax weighted 
average cost of capital for banks should have exceeded the risk free rate by 0.074 times the 
market risk premium, or approximately 40 basis points annually (= 45 x 12 x 0.074) using the 
market risk premium from Ken French’s data library of 45 basis points per month from July 
1971 through December 2011. This matches the estimation period that we will use below and 
roughly corresponds to the approach in Damadoran (2012).11 For the full CRSP history and the 
same asset beta, the corresponding figure was 57 basis points annually. 
In results available upon request, we confirm the relationships between capital and future 
beta using Compustat’s reported Tier 1 capital ratio (CAPR1Q) and total risk-based capital ratio 
(CAPR3Q). The slope coefficients and explanatory power are slightly lower in the Compustat 
data, suggesting that the call reports data is slightly more accurate.  
Finally, the bottom panels of Table 4 show that greater capital is also associated with 
higher idiosyncratic risk, at least for capital measures scaled by risk-weighted assets. The 
strongest relationship is between idiosyncratic risk and total risk-based capital to risk-weighted 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Damodaran’s approach is simple, but it is easy to find higher or lower estimates based on other methodologies or 
samples. The equity premium “puzzle” literature regards the historical premium as too high to be explained with 
standard intertemporal models (Mehra and Prescott (1985)). See Mehra (2008) for an overview. 
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assets, which, like Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets, also spreads beta well. Overall, capital 
ratios are somewhat more tightly linked to beta than to idiosyncratic risk.  
 
C.  The Low Risk Anomaly Within Banks 
The relationship between leverage and equity beta is consistent with the textbook 
Modigliani-Miller argument and essentially mechanical. The next question is whether this can be 
expected to reduce the cost of equity, as theory also predicts. Here the theory is not quite as 
strong, because it relies on the efficient pricing of CAPM risks across banks. The empirical 
alternative is that there is a low risk anomaly in banks similar to that in other firms. 
Table 5 runs cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth regressions of monthly returns on beta 
deciles. Under the CAPM, the coefficient on beta should reveal the market risk premium. 
Because of measurement error and skewness in beta, book-to-market, and momentum, we run 
these regressions using deciles instead of raw values. We are using beta deciles here, not beta per 
se, an approximate relationship to keep in mind is from Table 2, which shows that a movement 
of about seven deciles corresponds to an increase in pre-ranking beta of 1.2 and a difference in 
realized portfolio betas shown below of approximately 0.6. (The use of deciles or individual beta 
estimates is immaterial to the results; it is convenient to use deciles in subsequent analyses and 
we keep them here for consistency.) 
In the univariate regression of returns on beta decile alone, however, the point estimate is 
actually negative. Adjusting the point estimate to be in units of beta thus does not help us get to a 
plausible market risk premium. In the multivariate regression where we make the assumption 
that size, book-to-market, and return momentum are risk factors that need to be controlled for, 
there is also no meaningful relationship between beta and returns. For example, adjusting the 
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(statistically insignificant) point estimate to be in units of realized beta implies an implausibly 
small market risk premium of around 1% per year, far lower than realized market returns over 
the same or longer periods.  
In Table 6, we follow beta-sorted portfolios, and once again find no evidence of a 
positive relationship between beta and returns. We again divide stocks into three groups 
according to pre-ranking beta. Importantly, sorting stocks leads to a reliable difference in 
realized betas. The low beta, equal-weighted (value-weighted) portfolio has a realized CAPM 
beta of 0.56 (0.71) and the high beta portfolio has a beta roughly twice as high. This doubling in 
systematic risk should in theory lead to higher average returns over a period when equity returns 
overall were positive. Yet, the monthly returns in excess of the riskless rate are the same or lower 
for high beta stocks.  
Figure 4 shows these results in terms of cumulative raw returns, and also suggests why 
there is no statistical significance in raw returns differences—there are periods where low beta 
stocks underperform and risky stocks of both banks and nonbanks outperformed low risk stocks. 
One can view this either as a brief confirmation of the CAPM or an exceptional bubble which, 
when removed, strengthens the conclusions of a low risk anomaly elsewhere. 
Risk-adjusted underperformance is mechanically much greater and is also statistically 
significant. For a basic market model and value weighting, the underperformance rises to 41 
basis points per month. For a Fama-French three-factor model, the underperformance rises 
further to 46 basis points per month. Equal weighting stocks within each portfolio leads to 
similar conclusions.  
Turning to idiosyncratic risk in Table 7 shows that this side of the low risk anomaly also 
holds in banks. Here, the results are stronger in equal weighted portfolios. High idiosyncratic risk 
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underperformed low idiosyncratic risk by 28 basis points per month in raw terms, 46 basis points 
per month in beta-adjusted returns, and 76 basis points per month in Fama-French three-factor 
model adjusted returns. Qualitatively similar but quantitatively smaller patterns obtain for value-
weighted portfolios. Examining idiosyncratic returns has an important side benefit. As 
mentioned earlier, large banks have higher beta but lower idiosyncratic risk. The fact that the 
returns (and leverage) results are similar for both measures suggests that the conclusions apply 
both to large and small banks. It also suggests the interpretation that the three-factor results are 
statistically stronger precisely because they remove extra random variation that arises from the 
exposure to the size factor, isolating the low risk anomaly from the size anomaly. 
In Table 8, we extend the sample back to 1931 for beta-sorted portfolios and 
idiosyncratic risk sorted portfolios, and we show results for the full sample of CRSP stocks. As 
mentioned above, the bank portfolios contain relatively few banks in early years. Nontheless, the 
low risk anomaly is as large economically in the full sample as in the last 40 years, and results 
within banking stocks alone are consistent with those found in earlier research using the entire 
CRSP sample. 
In a final robustness check described in the previous section, we examine the link 
between capital ratios and risk-adjusted returns directly, rather than through the two-step process 
that we have relied on so far. This is an important check because it helps deal with the possibility 
that there is a low risk anomaly that flattens the link between beta and returns but that this 
anomaly is for some reason only relevant for variation in beta that does not come from leverage 
changes. There are two limitations to this test. One is conceptual: risk weighting may not be 
perfect, so we may be mismeasuring leverage and, in particular, endogenous leverage might limit 
our ability to detect a leverage effect. This is particularly acute for larger and more complex 
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banks, where equity risk is determined by asset mix across brokerage, asset management, and 
investment banking, not only traditional lending activity. Capital ratios from the call reports are 
likely a poor instrument for capturing variation in risk. The other limitation is empirical: we have 
risk adjusted capital calculations for a short period of time. There is enough data to estimate 
second moments, including betas, but perhaps not enough to measure means accurately. Again, 
this is likely more acute with value-weighted portfolios given the concentration in this industry.  
With these caveats in mind, we form capital sorted portfolios and show the alphas and 
betas in Table 9. The top panel shows equal weighted portfolios that emphasize those banks 
where there was a cleaner link between risk and capital ratios. The bottom panel shows value-
weighted portfolios. The results help to confirm the two-step logic. Capital is related to risk, as 
we showed earlier, and moreso in smaller and simpler banks. And, the risk-adjusted returns are 
lower for higher risk banks, with statistical significance in equal-weighted portfolios. If anything 
given the somewhat more modest variation in risk across capital sorted portfolios, relative to pre-
ranking beta sorted portfolios, the low risk anomaly is economically larger. 
 
V. Calibration 
 We now explore the quantitative effects of a hypothetical shift in capital requirements on 
the spread between banks’ weighted average cost of capital and the riskless rate. We first review 
the current regulatory environment to provide some context. We then proceed in three steps. 
First, we consider the simple case where there is a low risk anomaly in equities, but banks are 
otherwise able to raise risk-free and correctly priced debt. We also relax the assumption of risk-
free debt, but retain the assumption of efficiency in the debt market. Second, we layer on the 
possibility of a low risk anomaly for debt as well as equity securities. Third, we briefly consider 
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the effects of a government guarantee on bank debt. In each case, we maintain the assumption 
that this is a purely ceteris paribus shock to capital requirements and that banks’ asset betas 
remain fixed. In the conclusion, we comment on how some banks may be able to modify their 
business mix to “adapt” to such a policy shift. 
 
A. Regulatory Capital Requirements 
While countries have differed in the speed of reforms to capital requirements and their 
implementation details, the broad trend has been toward stricter requirements. Basel I, agreed in 
1988, defined Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital as well as risk-weighted assets, and required a minimum 
of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets of 4% and a total of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital of 8% 
(ratios here and below are also scaled by risk-weighted assets unless otherwise specified). Basel 
II, agreed in 2006, attempted to address deficiencies of Basel I by modifying the risk-weighting 
scheme and introducing a 2% requirement of common-only Tier 1 capital. Basel III, developed 
in 2011, further revised the definitions of risk-weighted assets, raised the required common Tier 
1 ratio to between 7% to 9.5% depending on market conditions, raised the required Tier 1 ratio to 
between 8.5% to 11%, and raised the total capital requirement to between 10.5% and 13%. As a 
backstop, Basel III also introduces a minimal requirement of 3% leverage ratio, defined as Tier 1 
capital to total (non-risk weighted) assets. (The U.S. Federal Reserve had long maintained a 
minimal leverage ratio requirement of 4%.) The U.S. Federal Reserve intends to transition to 
essentially the Basel III rules in phases, with full implementation now expected in 2019.12  
Such regulations are the outcome of interactions among regulators, politicians, investors, 
and bankers, each with somewhat different preferences and proposals. In recent years, some have 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
"$!See Saunders and Cornett (2010) and Yang (2012) for details on the recent history of banking regulation.!
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argued for raising the common Tier 1 ratio all the way up to 30% (Elliott (2013)). Accordingly, 
we follow Kashyap et al. (2010) and assume that regulators impose a 10% increase of capital 
requirements in the form of common equity. We assume that this is a fully binding and 
immediate increase from current levels for every bank. But it might, very roughly speaking, be 
viewed as the difference between a benchmark with no capital requirements and the current 
regime. We do not estimate the effect of any specific reform proposal, but our hypothetical 
change appears to fall in the relevant range in light of various policy proposals. 
Although we focus on capital requirements in this paper, we note that liquidity 
requirements of the sort called for in Basel III may also activate the low risk anomaly. Holding 
additional cash or liquid instruments reduces asset beta and overall risk, thus equity beta and 
idiosyncratic risk, which may then increase the cost of bank equity.  
!
B. The Effect of Higher Capital Requirements on the Weighted Average Cost of Capital  
We start by supposing that the CAPM holds, but with a low risk anomaly.13 In other 
words, higher beta equities underperform their CAPM benchmark and lower beta equities 
outperform their CAPM benchmark. In particular, returns are assumed to take the following 
linear form: 
, (2) 
where  is the  of any equity i, rf is the risk free rate, rp is the market risk premium, and 
 measures the extent of the low risk anomaly. Note that Baker et al. (2011) derive a 
pricing equation of exactly this form when investment is delegated to an investment manager 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
"%!Interestingly, the CAPM has a special formal status in the Federal Reserve. Congress requires that the Federal 
Reserve banks provide payment services at a price that recoups what a private-sector provider would obtain. In 
practice, a simple beta-one CAPM is a fundamental element of this estimate. !
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with a typical information-ratio objective. (That is, to maximize the return on the portfolio in 
excess of a benchmark divided by the standard deviation of the portfolio return over the 
benchmark.) Also assume that debt is correctly priced by the CAPM at: 
. (3) 
We relax this assumption in an extension below. 
The cost of capital for a bank is the weighted average of the cost of debt rd and the cost of 
equity re: 
, (4) 
where e is the ratio of equity to total assets. We can then substitute equation (2) and equation (3) 
into equation (4), and simplify:  
, (5) 
where  is the  of the banks’ operating assets which we assume is invariant to its capital 
structure. 
We are interested in how the cost of capital changes with a change in capital 
requirements that moves the bank from its old level of capital e to a new regulatory level e*. 
Differencing equation (5), evaluated at the new and old levels of capital, and substituting out the 
equity beta, leads to the following increase in the cost of capital: 
.(6) 
A special case is when the debt is riskless, in both capital regimes, so that . This 
means that the change in the cost of capital is simply , which is greater than zero for 
increases in the ratio of equity e. In general, we believe that the effects of changing debt betas are 
likely to be small. Given that bank equity betas are somewhat less than 1.0 on average, and 
ri = rf +!drp
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equity ratios are in the range of 8 to 19 percent in Table 3, estimates of  for banks are quite 
small, estimates of  are by definition smaller, and differences in  are smaller still. Even so, 
this simplified measure of the change in the cost of capital under the assumption of riskless debt 
should be viewed as an upper bound. The term A(e,e*) is greater than zero when e > e*. When 
debt shares the asset risk with equity, the impact of an increase in capital requirements on equity 
betas is mitigated somewhat. 
We can use Table 4 to get a rough sense of the size of . In Figure 5 Panel A, we 
plot the estimated alphas and betas from Table 6, separately for CAPM and Fama-French three 
factor regressions. The CAPM betas range from 0.56 for an equal-weighted portfolio of low beta 
banks to 1.27 for a value-weighted portfolio of high beta banks. The corresponding three factor 
betas range from 0.55 to 1.32. The portfolio alphas range from -48 basis points per month for the 
value-weighted portfolio of high beta banks, controlling for the size and book-to-market factors, 
to 34 basis points per month for the equal-weighted portfolio of low beta banks, controlling only 
for the market factor. The figure shows simple regressions of alpha on beta for the two sets of 
portfolio alphas and betas. The historical slope estimates of  are -68 and -75 basis points 
per month.  
Assuming riskless debt, this assumed linear relationship between beta and alpha indicates 
that a 10 percentage point increase in required equity capital would be associated with an 82 (= 
68 x 12 x 0.1) to 90 basis point increase in the weighted average cost of capital, and, assuming 
competitive lending markets, a corresponding increase in spreads.  
As a robustness test, Panel B plots the analogous results from Table 6-style regressions 
that exclude two prominent crisis periods, October 1989 through October 1990 and January 2007 
through February 2009. It is not the case that the underperformance of high-beta banks is due to 
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exceptionally poor performance during crises, and the anomaly is roughly linear whether one 
includes or excludes such periods.  
Finally, in Figure 6 we substitute the data from Table 6 with comparable estimates using 
the entire CRSP universe of financial and nonfinancial firms. If anything, the low risk anomaly is 
actually stronger in banks than nonfinancial firms. Using the linear, all-CRSP slope estimates, a 
10 percentage point increase in required equity capital is associated with a weighted average cost 
of capital increase of 61 to 65 basis points. So, the range of estimates using a linear empirical 
model of only banking stocks or all US stocks and using a simple CAPM or a three-factor model, 
is from 60 to 90 basis points. 
Of course, there are presumably limits to these effects. A deeply undercapitalized bank 
with extraordinarily risky equity (and somehow granted a reprieve from FDIC seizure) has a cost 
of equity that is hard to measure and may or may not be extremely low. At the other end of the 
spectrum, the equity of an otherwise typical bank with no debt at all will be so transparently low 
risk that investors may already be categorizing it as effectively low cost, high-grade debt. Since 
our sample does not include banks with no debt or with no equity, our evidence speaks only to 
the observed and empirically relevant range. 
 
C. Extension 1: Adding a Low Risk Anomaly for Debt 
The calibration is greatly simplified with the assumption of fairly priced and riskless 
debt. The important assumption, though, is not that debt is riskless but that the debt and equity 
markets are not efficiently integrated. If the two markets are integrated and a single equation (2) 
governs the pricing of debt and equity, then the Modigliani and Miller theorem is restored and 
the cost of capital for banks is simply equal to: 
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, (7) 
which is independent of the chosen capital structure e. This is illustrated in the first panel of 
Figure 7. There is a low risk anomaly, but it prices both debt and equity with the same return 
generating process. What is needed is segmented equity markets, so that the expected return on 
debt does not fall on an extension of the line that relates beta and return in the equity market. 
This sort of segmentation is illustrated in the second panel of Figure 7. 
Given the magnitude of the low risk anomaly within equity markets, this sort of debt 
market integration suggests an implausibly large expected return on debt. An investment grade 
debt security, say with a beta equal to 0.1, would have an expected alpha of 0.9 x 68 = 61 to 0.9 
x 75 = 68 basis points per month according to equation (2) and Figure 5, and all debt securities, 
with & well below 1, would offer large, risk-adjusted expected returns. Spreads on corporate 
debt are smaller than this by an order of magnitude, so integrated markets of this sort are not 
likely to be empirically relevant.  
Figure 8 casts further doubt on integrated low risk anomalies. We compute betas and 
average returns for government and corporate debt over the matching period, and plot these 
along with the quintile equity portfolios computed as in the fifth and sixth columns of Table 6. 
This gives us a sufficient number of stocks to compute quintile portfolios going back to the 
beginning of the CRSP sample. Two observations are worth making. First, the corporate bond 
data point falls below the extended security market line computed from the equity market in both 
samples. Using the seven portfolios in Panel B as data points, for example, a simple regression of 
excess returns on beta and dummies for Treasury bonds and corporates gives t-stats of -2.43 and 
-2.24 for the dummies. Second, while the corporate bond returns still fall above the theoretical 
security market line, most of this is simply a term premium that is in both government and 
WACC = !a !1( )! + rf +"arp
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corporate bonds. Hence, there is little evidence that there is a common low risk anomaly across 
debt and equity markets. 
More plausible is a low risk anomaly that holds within each asset class, along the lines of 
Frazzini and Pedersen (2013), but not across asset classes. Baker, Bradley, and Wurgler (2012) 
emphasize that an upward sloping risk and return relationship holds across asset classes, ranging 
from government securities to small cap stocks. This means equation (3) could be modified as 
follows: 
, (8) 
where it is the difference of an individual debt security’s  from the average of all debt 
securities (not 1) that determines the extent of mispricing. Now the overall cost of capital equals: 
. (9) 
The analogue of equation (6), the change in the cost of capital as leverage changes, is: 
. (10) 
An analytically simple special case is when the extent of the low risk anomaly per unit change in 
!is the same within each asset class, so that . This means that the change in the cost of 
capital is simply , which is greater than zero for increases in the ratio of equity e.  
The terms that depend on the change in the debt beta drop out, because there are exactly 
offsetting effects. On the one hand, the debt becomes safer, sharing some of the risk reduction in 
equity as leverage decreases and thus mitigating the increase in the cost of equity. This is the 
impact shown within the first term of equation (10), multiplied by , and it arises because the 
equity beta falls less than linearly in the inverse of the leverage ratio, and the cost of capital rises 
by less than in the case of riskless debt. On the other hand, because there is less of the now safer, 
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lower , debt, the cost of capital rises by more than in the case of riskless debt. Because of the 
low risk anomaly within the debt markets, safer debt is more expensive on a risk-adjusted basis. 
These two effects offset exactly, when the extent of the low risk anomaly is the same within the 
two asset classes. When the low risk anomaly is smaller in debt markets, the effect of changing 
debt betas on mitigating the rise in the cost of equity is larger, so that an increase in capital 
increases the cost of capital by less than in the case where  and the simplified expression 
is an upper bound effect. 
The simplified expression  contains an extra term added to the case of 
correctly priced, riskless debt. It measures the extent to which the two markets are not integrated, 
in other words the difference between the pricing of debt and equity in equations (2) and (7) 
versus (8). If the markets are perfectly integrated, so that , then the Modigliani and Miller 
theorem holds. If there is a separate low risk anomaly within each asset class, so that , 
the effects are slightly smaller than in the riskless debt case. 
 
D. Extension 2: Adding Government Subsidies 
The analysis so far considers situations where the government is not involved in insuring 
the debt of banks. Deposit insurance means that a bank can issue risky debt at the riskless rate of 
return. It means equation (3) for the pricing of debt can be modified to: 
. (11) 
For the bank, the result is something very similar to the riskless case, except that the debt, despite 
being priced as riskless, shares some of the risk of equity, mitigating the effect of the low risk 
anomaly on the cost of equity: 
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. (12) 
If , which is empirically not far from the estimates derived for , then the effect on bank 
cost of capital is the same as it was in the riskless case. Again, there are two offsetting effects for 
the bank. As rp increases, the effect of leverage on the cost of capital is larger than in the riskless 
case. This is intuitive: lower leverage means that the bank gets a smaller subsidy from the 
government. There is less debt overall and the debt that remains requires a smaller subsidy. As  
increases in absolute value, the effect of leverage on the cost of capital is smaller than in the 
riskless case. This is because the impact of debt sharing in the risk of equity is magnified relative 
to the riskless case where there is no risk sharing.  
Another conclusion from equation (12) is that the government subsidy falls, of course, as 
capital increases, but there is an additional increase in the cost of capital that is not zero-sum 
between the government and banks, because their cost of equity capital increases. 
 
E. Summary of the Calibration 
Heightened capital requirements will, in the presence of a low volatility anomaly in 
stocks, increase the weighted average cost of capital for banks. Table 9 summarizes the 
theoretical analysis. So long as capital markets are segmented, the basic effect is simply the 
product of the percentage point increase in equity capital times the excess risk-adjusted 
performance per unit of beta. For a binding 10 percentage point increase in capital, point 
estimates for these effects are in the range of 60 to 90 basis points, depending primarily on 
whether we rely on the general pattern in all stocks or the experience of banks alone. These are 
attenuated in the case of risky debt or when there is a more modest low volatility anomaly in debt 
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markets as well. It seems likely that this attenuation is slight, in large part because bank debt 
betas overall are small. 
To put 60 and 90 basis points in some perspective, recall that our asset beta estimate for 
banks was 0.074. With the historical risk premium, this suggests a pre-tax weighted average cost 
of capital under the CAPM of around 40 basis points per year above the risk-free rate over the 
same 40-year period. Relative to this spread, the effects of significantly heightened capital 
requirements when combined with the historical low volatility anomaly are considerable. They 
suggest more than doubling the weighted average cost of capital, when it is measured as a 
premium over the risk-free rate, to 100 to 130 basis points. 
 
VI. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
Regulators and bankers are concerned about the effect of capital requirements on the cost 
of capital and lending rates, among other consequences. Standard theory maintains that this is 
naïve in perfect and efficient capital markets, because increased capital will reduce the beta and 
thus the cost of equity, leaving the overall cost of capital unchanged. We find that this theory 
does not line up well with the data for banks. While less leverage reduces equity risk, this in turn 
puts the low risk anomaly into play. In an 80-year sample, lower risk banks have the same or 
higher stock returns than higher risk banks. Therefore, reducing equity beta will reduce the cost 
of equity only if long-term (and worldwide, based on other evidence) patterns are reversed.  
In a simple calibration that uses the long-term historical relationship between risk and 
return, we find that a binding ten percentage-point increase in the required Tier 1 capital to risk-
weighted assets ratio would have increased the overall cost of capital by approximately 90 basis 
points. Given the relatively low estimate for the beta of bank assets overall, this would more than 
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double the spread of the cost of capital over the risk-free rate. Such an effect would put banks at 
a larger competitive disadvantage relative to a less-regulated shadow banking system.  
While we encourage more research on the basic links between leverage and the cost of 
capital in both banks and nonbanks, with the results in hand we discuss some tentative policy 
implications. We assume conservatively that the anomaly itself is due to market features and 
investor behavior and cannot be reversed via policy. The main issue is then how to keep banks’ 
equity “attractively risky” without reducing their stability.  
One possibility is that smaller and narrower banks be given relatively less stringent 
capital requirements. Our results speak most clearly to the regulation of relatively narrow banks, 
because they have fewer ways of increasing the risk of their assets through altering the business 
mix toward, for example, brokerage, underwriting, sales and trading, or proprietary trading. 
Banks are indeed clever to adapt their business mix to minimize the impact of capital 
requirements (Duchin and Sosura (2014)). To some extent, this is already a regulatory trend in 
that banks designated as systemically important, which generally also have diverse lines of 
business, are subject to somewhat stricter capital requirements. Our evidence can be seen as an 
additional reason to differentiate between traditional banks and these broader institutions. 
Another possibility is to consider unsecured debt or hybrid debt more flexibly in the 
calculation of the capital of bank holding companies, and maintain strict capital requirements for 
the bank subsidiary. Depending on their features, these instruments may qualify only as Tier 2 or 
Tier 3 capital. Of course, regardless how they are considered for regulatory purposes, it is 
important that such instruments do not exhibit a low risk anomaly to the same degree. Our 
evidence suggests that this is unlikely to be the case. This approach also requires clear rules on 
resolution.  
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We repeat the qualification given in the introduction. When all other private and social 
costs and benefits are totaled up, strict capital requirements may well remain desirable. Our 
contribution is to point out that based on the available evidence, the low volatility stock market 
anomaly may produce an underappreciated and potentially significant cost to add to this calculus. 
 36 
References  
Admati, Anat R., P. M. DeMarzo, M. F. Hellwig, and P. C. Pfleiderer. “Fallacies, Irrelevant 
Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Expensive.” 
Stanford University working paper (2011). 
Admati, Anat R., M. Hellwig. The Bankers’ New Clothes. Princeton: Princeton UP (2013).  
Aiyer, Shekhar, C. W. Calomiris, T. Wieladek. “Does Macro-Pru Leak? Evidence from a UK 
Policy Experiment.” Columbia University Graduate School of Business working paper (2012).  
Allen, Franklin, E. Carletti. “Deposits and Bank Capital Structure.” University of Pennsylvania 
working paper (2013).  
Ang, Andrew, R. Hodrick, Y. Xing, X. Zhang. “The Cross-Section of Volatility and Expected 
Returns.” Journal of Finance 61 (2006), pp. 259-299. 
–. “High Idiosyncratic Volatility and Low Returns: International and Further U.S. Evidence.” 
Journal of Financial Economics 91 (2009), pp. 1-23. 
Baker, Malcolm, B. Bradley, R. Taliaferro. “The Low Risk Anomaly: A Decomposition into 
Micro and Macro Effects.” Harvard Business School, working paper (2013).  
Baker, Malcolm, B. Bradley, J. Wurgler. “Benchmarks as Limits to Arbitrage: Understanding the 
Low-Volatility Anomaly.” Financial Analysts Journal 67 (2011), pp. 40-54.  
Bali, Turan, N. Cakici, R. Whitelaw. “Maxing Out: Stocks as Lotteries and the Cross-Section of 
Expected Returns.” Journal of Financial Economics 99 (2011), pp. 427-446. 
Barberis, Nicholas, M. Huang. “Stocks as Lotteries: The Implications of Probability Weighting 
for Security Prices.” American Economic Review 98 (2008), pp. 2066-2100. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. “An Assessment of the Long-term Economic Impact 
of Stronger Capital and Liquidity Requirements.” Bank for International Settlements mimeo 
(2010). 
Black, Fischer. “Capital Market Equilibrium with Restricted Borrowing.” Journal of Business 45 
(1972), pp. 444-455. 
Black, Fischer, M. C. Jensen, M. Scholes. “The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Some Empirical 
Tests.” In M. C. Jensen, ed., Studies in the Theory of Capital Markets. New York: Praeger 
(1972), pp. 79-121. 
Blitz, David, P. V. Vliet. “The Volatility Effect: Lower Risk Without Lower Return.” Journal of 
Portfolio Management 34 (2007), pp. 102-113. 
 37 
Blitz, David, J. Pang, P. V. Vliet. “The Volatility Effect in Emerging Markets.” Robeco Asset 
Management, working paper (2012). 
Brennan, Michael. “Agency and Asset Pricing.” University of California, Los Angeles, working 
paper (1993). 
Cornell, Bradford. “The Pricing of Volatility and Skewness: A New Interpretation.” California 
Institute of Technology working paper (2008). 
Coval, Joshua, J. Jurek, E. Stafford. “The Economics of Structured Finance.” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 23 (2009), pp. 3-25.  
Cummins, Jason G., K. A. Hassett, R. G. Hubbard. “A Reconsideration of Investment Behavior 
Using Tax Reforms as Natural Experiments.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2 (1994), 
pp. 1-74. 
Damodaran, Aswath. “Equity Risk Premiums (ERP): Determinants, Estimation and Implications 
– 2012 Edition.” NYU Stern School of Business working paper (2012). 
DeAngelo, Harry, R. M. Stulz. “Why High Leverage is Optimal for Banks.” Ohio State 
University working paper (2013).  
Duchin, Ran, D. Sosyura. “Safer Ratios, Riskier Portfolios: Banks’ Response to Government 
Aid.” Journal of Financial Economics (forthcoming, 2014). 
Elliott, Douglas J. “Quantifying the Effects on Lending of Increased Capital Requirements.” The 
Brookings Institution mimeo (2009).  
Elliott, Douglas J. “A Further Exploration of Bank Capital Requirements: Effects of Competition 
from Other Financial Sectors and Effects of Size of Bank or Borrower and of Loan Type.” The 
Brookings Institution mimeo (2010).  
Elliott, Douglas J. “Higher Bank Capital Requirements Would Come at a Price.” Brookings 
Institute Internet posting. http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/02/20-bank-capital-
requirements-elliott (February 20, 2013). 
Fama, Eugene F., K. R. French. “The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns.” Journal of 
Finance 47 (1992), pp. 427-465.  
Fama, Eugene F., K. R. French, “Industry Costs of Equity.” Journal of Financial Economics 43 
(1997), pp. 153–193. 
Fama, Eugene F., J. D. MacBeth. “Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests.” Journal of 
Political Economy 81 (1973), pp. 607-636. 
 38 
Frazzini, Andrea, L. H. Pedersen. “Betting Against Beta.” NYU Stern School of Business 
working paper (2013). 
Gilchrist, S., J. W. Sim, and E. Zakrajsek. “Misallocation and Financial Market Frictions: Some 
Direct Evidence from the Dispersion in Borrowing Costs.” Review of Economic Dynamics 16 
(2013), pp. 159-176. 
Gornall, Will, I. A. Strebulaev. “Financing as a Supply Chain: The Capital Structure of Banks 
and Borrowers.” Stanford Graduate School of Business working paper (2014).   
Graham, John, “How Big Are the Tax Benefits of Debt.” Journal of Finance 63 (2000), pp. 1901-
1941. 
Haugen, Robert A., A. J. Heins, “Risk and the Rate of Return on Financial Assets: Some Old 
Wine in New Bottles.” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 10 (1975), pp. 775-784. 
Hong, Harrison, D. Sraer. “Speculative Betas.” Princeton University working paper (2012).  
Ibbotson Associates, 2012, Ibbotson SBBI 2012 Classic Yearbook (Morningstar, Chicago).  
Jegadeesh, Narasimhan, S. Titman, “Returns to Buying Winners and Selling Losers: Implications 
for Stock Market Efficiency.”  Journal of Finance 48 (1993), pp. 65-91. 
Karceski, Jason. “Returns-Chasing Behavior, Mutual Funds, and Beta’s Death. “ Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 37 (2002), pp. 559-594. 
Kashyap, Anil K., Stein, J. C., and S. Hanson. “An Analysis of the Impact of ‘Substantially 
Heightened’ Capital Requirements on Large Financial Institutions.” Harvard University working 
paper (2010). 
Kumar, Alok. “Who Gambles in the Stock Market?” Journal of Finance 64 (2009), pp. 1889-1933.  
Macroeconomic Assessment Group of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. “Assessing 
the Macroeconomic Impact of the Transition to Stronger Capital and Liquidity Requirements – 
Final Report.” Bank for International Settlements mimeo (2010).  
Mehra, Rajnish. Handbook of the Equity Risk Premium. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2008.  
Mehra, Rajnish, E. C. Prescott. “The Equity Premium: A Puzzle.” Journal of Monetary 
Economics 15 (1985), pp. 145-161. 
Philippon, Thomas. “The Bond Market’s q.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 124 (2009), pp. 
1011-1056. 
Santos, Andre Oliveira, D. Elliott. “Estimating the Costs of Financial Regulation.” IMF Staff 
Discussion Note (2012).  
 39 
Saunders, Anthony, and M. Cornett. Financial Institutions Management: A Risk Management 
Approach. Seventh Edition. New York: McGraw-Hill (2010). 
Tversky, Amos, D. Kahneman. “Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of 
Uncertainty.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5 (1992), pp. 297-323. 
Van den Heuvel, Skander J. “The Welfare Cost of Bank Capital Requirements.” Journal of 
Monetary Economics 55 (2008), pp. 298-320.  
Yang, Emily. “Bank Capital and Regulation.” Federal Reserve Bank of New York presentation 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/education/pdf/2012/Yang_bank_capital_regulation.pdf. (March 20, 
2012).
Figure 1. Pre-ranking Beta in the Banking Industry, Value-Weighted. Value-weighted pre-ranking beta, July 
1971 through December 2011. We define the banking industry as the union of the banking SIC codes from Ken 
French’s definition of 48 industries and the three-digit SIC 671, which includes bank holding companies. Pre-
ranking beta is computed by regressing a minimum of 24 months and a maximum of 60 months of trailing holding 
period returns (RET) on the corresponding CRSP value-weighted market holding period returns (VWRETD). The 
sample is divided into low (bottom 30%), medium (middle 40%), and high (top 30%) portfolios according to pre-
ranking beta. The sample includes firms for which we can compute a valid beta, with at least 24 monthly holding 
period return (RET) observations, a valid market capitalization, with a nonmissing price (PRC) and shares 
outstanding (SHROUT) observation, and at least one holding period return following a valid beta. 
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Figure 2. Bank Capital and Beta: Empirical Predictions. Exogenous changes in the inverse capital ratio on the x-
axis should be associated linearly with increases in equity beta if the changes in capital are exogenous and the debt 
is approximately risk free. The slope is equal to the asset beta. Endogenous leverage choice, where a bank chooses 
higher or lower leverage to match its asset beta risk, or risky debt will both tend to flatten the predicted relationship. 
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Figure 3. Kernel regressions of future beta on the inverse capital ratio. The dependent variable is the forward 
beta, computed by regressing a minimum of 24 months and a maximum of 60 months of future holding period 
returns (RET) in excess of the riskless rate on the corresponding CRSP value-weighted market holding period 
returns (VWRETD, also in excess of the riskless rate). The independent variable is the ratio of total risk-based 
capital (RCFD3792) to Tier 1 capital (RCFD8274). Panel A includes all banks. Panel B includes only banks above 
the median market capitalization in each month. The local polynomial regressions use a Epanechnikov kernel, with 
20 bins and smoothing interval of 0.1. 
Panel A. All banks 
 
Panel B. Large banks 
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Figure 4. Beta Sorted Portfolio Returns. Portfolio returns for low, medium, and high beta bank stocks. Each 
portfolio total return in excess of the riskless rate is computed using either equal or value weights. The sample is 
divided within each month into low (bottom 30%), medium (middle 40%), and high (top 30%) portfolios according 
to pre-ranking beta. Pre-ranking beta and the sample are described in Table 2. 
 
Panel A. Equal Weighted Portfolio 
 
 
Panel B. Value Weighted Portfolio 
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Figure 5. The Estimated Size of the Low Beta Anomaly in the Banking Industry. Plots of CAPM and Fama-
French 3-Factor alpha and beta for six portfolios. The alphas and betas are described in Table 6. Slopes from linear 
regressions of alpha on beta are shown on the plots. Panel A shows the results for the banking industry as defined in 
Table 1. Panel B excludes the peak to trough periods in the middle bank portfolio from October 1989 through 
October 1990 and from January 2007 through February 2009. Excluding the periods of poor ex post performance 
increases the alpha estimates. 
Panel A. Banks 
 
Panel B. Banks, Excluding Two Crisis Periods 
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Figure 6. The Estimated Size of the Low Beta Anomaly for All Firms. Plots of CAPM and Fama-French 3-
Factor alpha and beta for six portfolios. The alphas and betas are estimated as in Table 6, but for all CRSP firms. 
Slopes from linear regressions of alpha on beta are shown on the plots. 
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Figure 7. Segmented Debt and Equity Markets. For the low risk anomaly to impact the cost of capital, debt and 
equity markets must be segmented. Panel A shows a low risk anomaly that extends across asset classes, e.g. from 
safe debt with very low beta to equity with higher beta, rendering capital structure irrelevant. Panel B shows 
segmented debt and equity markets, but with a low risk anomaly appearing within each market. 
Panel A. Integrated Debt and Equity Markets 
 
Panel B. Segmented Debt and Equity Markets 
 
  
 47 
Figure 8. Bond Returns and the Low Risk Anomaly in Stocks. Plots of average returns and CAPM betas for five 
equity portfolios sorted into quintiles using pre-ranking betas as well as corporate and government bonds from 
Ibbotson and Associates. The returns and betas are estimated as in Table 6, but using quintiles and all CRSP firms 
for the equity portfolios. An empirical security market line using the five equity portfolios is plotted using a linear fit 
through the five data points on stocks. 
Panel A. Quintile Portfolios and Bond Returns, July 1971 through December 2011 
 
Panel B. Segmented Debt and Equity Markets, January 1931 through December 2011 
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Table 1. Banking Industry. Number of firms in each industry group by decade and overall, July 1971 through 
December 2011. We define the banking industry as the union of the banking SIC codes from Ken French’s data 
library definition of 48 industries and the three-digit SIC 671, which includes bank holding companies. The sample 
includes firms for which we can compute a valid beta, with at least 24 monthly holding period return (RET) 
observations, a valid market capitalization, with a nonmissing price (PRC) and shares outstanding (SHROUT) 
observation, and at least one holding period return following a valid beta. There are relatively few publicly traded 
banks in the first half of the CRSP sample, so we focus on the second half, using July 1971 as a start date. Table 8 
shows the full sample as a robustness check. 
 
  CRSP Firms 
SIC Code Industry 
1971-
1979 
1980-
1989 
1990-
1999 
2000-
2011 Total 
6000-6000 Depository institutions 0 0 1 2 3 
6020-6020 Commercial banks 1 213 465 334 597 
6021-6021 National commercial banks 0 4 51 144 165 
6022-6022 State banks - Fed Res System 13 30 76 229 276 
6023-6024 State banks - not Fed Res System 15 31 7 0 33 
6025-6025 National banks - Fed Res System 62 120 45 4 131 
6026-6026 National banks - not Fed Res System 0 1 2 0 2 
6027-6027 National banks, not FDIC 0 1 0 0 1 
6028-6029 Banks 1 1 7 46 48 
6030-6036 Savings institutions 0 142 463 427 674 
6040-6059 Other Banks 4 11 5 1 13 
6060-6062 Credit unions 0 0 10 1 10 
6120-6129 S&Ls 29 130 20 4 142 
6130-6139 Agricultural credit institutions 0 1 1 0 1 
6140-6149 Personal credit institutions (Beneficial) 23 21 47 40 92 
6150-6159 Business credit institutions 9 33 56 56 115 
6160-6169 Mortgage bankers 16 34 68 52 119 
6170-6179 Finance lessors 0 0 3 1 3 
6190-6199 Financial services 0 2 3 2 7 
6710-6719 Holding offices 315 852 968 182 1520 
 Total 
485 1,394 1,786 1,316 3,952 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics: CRSP Data. Summary statistics by pre-ranking risk, July 1971 through December 
2011. We define the banking industry as the union of the banking SIC codes from Ken French’s definition of 48 
industries and the three-digit SIC 671, which includes bank holding companies. Pre-ranking beta is computed by 
regressing a minimum of 24 months and a maximum of 60 months of trailing holding period returns in excess of the 
riskless rate on the corresponding CRSP value-weighted market holding period returns (VWRETD, also in excess of 
the riskless rate). Pre-ranking root mean squared error uses the residuals from these regressions. In the first two 
panels, the sample is divided within each month into low (bottom 30%), medium (middle 40%), and high (top 30%) 
portfolios according to pre-ranking beta. The last panel sorts by RMSE. Market capitalization is equal to price 
(PRC) times shares outstanding (SHROUT). Book-to-market ratio is the ratio of book equity to market 
capitalization. Book equity is computed as described in Ken French’s data library. The sample includes firms for 
which we can compute a valid beta, with at least 24 monthly holding period return (RET) observations, a valid 
market capitalization, with a nonmissing price (PRC) and shares outstanding (SHROUT) observation, and at least 
one holding period return following a valid beta.  
 
 Pre-Ranking Risk 
 N 
Bottom 
30% N 
Middle 
40% N 
Top  
30% 
Panel A. Means, Pre-Ranking Beta Sorts 
Pre-Ranking Beta 82,082 0.18 109,456 0.68 80,493 1.37 
   Decile 82,082 2.00 109,456 5.50 80,493 8.99 
Pre-Ranking Root Mean Squared Error (%) 82,082 8.05 109,456 8.37 80,493 10.94 
   Decile 82,082 4.69 109,456 5.15 80,493 6.69 
Market Capitalization ($M) 82,082 210.6 109,456 702.8 80,493 3,012.0 
Book-to-Market Ratio 54,356 1.39 86,643 1.87 66,955 3.63 
Return from t-12 through t-2 (%) 81,312 12.62 109,075 14.00 80,135 14.06 
Panel B. Medians, Pre-Ranking Beta Sorts 
Pre-Ranking Beta  0.21  0.67  1.27 
   Decile  2.00  5.00  9.00 
Pre-Ranking Root Mean Squared Error (%)  6.89  7.35  9.43 
   Decile  4.00  5.00  7.00 
Market Capitalization  47.3  95.8  196.1 
Book-to-Market Ratio  0.76  0.76  0.76 
Return from t-12 through t-2 (%)  8.86  11.11  10.29 
Panel C. Means, Pre-Ranking RMSE Sorts 
Pre-Ranking Beta 82,420 0.56 109,288 0.71 80,323 0.95 
   Decile 82,420 4.52 109,288 5.45 80,323 6.50 
Pre-Ranking Root Mean Squared Error (%) 82,420 5.39 109,288 7.94 80,323 14.26 
   Decile 82,420 2.00 109,288 5.50 80,323 8.99 
Market Capitalization ($M) 82,420 2,172.5 109,288 1,141.1 80,323 409.5 
Book-to-Market Ratio 66,126 1.77 84,061 2.23 57,767 3.04 
Return from t-12 through t-2 (%) 82,048 13.52 108,730 14.00 79,744 13.14 
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Table 3. Capital Adequacy and Realized Portfolio Beta. The sample is divided within each month into ten decile 
portfolios according to capital.  Each portfolio total return in excess of the riskless rate is computed using either 
equal or value weights. The first two columns use the ratio of total equity capital (RCFD3210) divided by average 
total assets (RCFD3368). The second two columns use Tier 1 capital (RCFD8274) in place of total equity capital. 
The third two columns use total risk-based capital (RCFD3792) in place of total equity capital. The fourth and fifth 
pairs of columns use total risk-weighted assets (RCFDa223) in place of average total assets. The sample runs from 
March 1996, the first date where RCFD8274 is available, through February 2011. It includes 74,105 firm-months for 
which we can compute capital ratios from the Federal Reserve Bank, a valid market capitalization, with a 
nonmissing price (PRC) and shares outstanding (SHROUT) observation, and at least one holding period return 
following a valid capital ratio. 
 
Decile 
Sorts 
By: Equity to Assets 
Tier 1 Capital to 
Assets 
Risk-Based 
Capital to Assets 
Tier 1 Capital to 
Risk-Weighted 
Assets 
Risk-Based Capital 
to Risk-Weighted 
Assets 
Decile Median 
VW 
Mean Median 
VW 
Mean Median 
VW 
Mean Median 
VW 
Mean Median 
VW 
Mean 
Panel A. Capital Adequacy (%) 
1 6.58 6.58 6.15 6.27 7.02 6.78 8.24 8.16 10.26 10.45 
2 7.54 7.60 6.84 6.85 7.81 8.05 9.30 9.30 10.79 10.91 
3 8.05 8.03 7.23 7.27 8.27 8.44 9.77 9.85 11.17 11.23 
4 8.46 8.66 7.55 7.55 8.62 8.74 10.17 10.30 11.54 11.55 
5 8.82 8.92 7.88 7.87 8.94 9.03 10.61 10.83 11.93 12.00 
6 9.19 9.25 8.21 8.24 9.27 9.39 11.11 11.29 12.41 12.38 
7 9.64 9.94 8.59 8.66 9.67 9.73 11.70 11.90 12.98 13.01 
8 10.17 10.74 9.09 9.05 10.16 10.19 12.51 12.60 13.77 13.70 
9 11.00 10.92 9.81 9.95 10.87 10.78 13.94 14.02 15.18 15.17 
10 13.24 15.26 11.45 14.33 12.51 13.74 17.26 18.36 18.45 19.82 
10-1 6.66 8.68 5.29 8.06 5.48 6.96 9.02 10.20 8.20 9.37 
Panel B. Realized Portfolio Beta 
1 0.80 1.20 0.86 1.35 0.78 0.97 0.93 1.24 0.76 0.80 
2 0.65 1.18 0.74 1.12 0.64 0.88 0.82 1.16 0.75 0.89 
3 0.60 0.78 0.68 0.95 0.65 1.04 0.67 1.29 0.71 1.00 
4 0.65 1.04 0.67 0.92 0.65 1.19 0.66 1.11 0.70 1.11 
5 0.70 1.11 0.66 1.05 0.64 1.12 0.63 0.96 0.67 1.06 
6 0.70 1.05 0.69 1.12 0.68 1.07 0.69 0.98 0.73 1.19 
7 0.66 1.26 0.60 1.00 0.63 1.16 0.61 0.76 0.64 1.14 
8 0.59 1.19 0.64 1.02 0.63 1.10 0.63 0.92 0.64 1.14 
9 0.66 1.03 0.54 0.81 0.71 1.23 0.50 1.08 0.55 1.03 
10 0.63 1.23 0.57 1.24 0.63 1.27 0.50 0.91 0.49 0.96 
10-1 -0.18 0.03 -0.28 -0.11 -0.15 0.30 -0.43 -0.34 -0.26 0.16 
Panel C. T-Stat 
10-1 [-1.8] [0.3] [-2.8] [-1.1] [-1.6] [3.3] [-4.0] [-3.6] [-2.5] [1.5] 
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Table 4. Bank Capital and Forward Systematic and Idiosyncratic Risk. Regressions of forward beta or 
idiosyncratic risk on measures of bank capital. The dependent variable in Panels A and B is the forward beta, 
computed by regressing a minimum of 24 months and a maximum of 60 months of trailing holding period returns in 
excess of the riskless rate on the corresponding CRSP value-weighted market holding period returns (VWRETD, 
also in excess of the riskless rate). The dependent variable in Panels C and D is the root mean squared residual from 
these regressions. Both are Winsorized at 1% and 99%. The first two columns use the ratio of total equity capital 
(RCFD3210) divided by average total assets (RCFD3368) as the independent variable. The second two columns use 
Tier 1 capital (RCFD8274) in place of total equity capital. The third two columns use total risk-based capital 
(RCFD3792) in place of total equity capital. The fourth and fifth pairs of columns use total risk-weighted assets 
(RCFDa223) in place of average total assets. The sample runs from March 1996, the first date where RCFD8274 is 
available, through December 2010. The last forward beta that we can compute is in December 2010, using CRSP 
data through December 2012. 
 
 
Equity to Assets 
Tier 1 Capital 
to Assets 
Risk-Based 
Capital to 
Assets 
Tier 1 Capital 
to Risk-
Weighted 
Assets 
Risk-Based 
Capital to 
Risk-Weighted 
Assets 
 Coef [T] Coef [T] Coef [T] Coef [T] Coef [T] 
Panel A: Fama-MacBeth, Dependent Variable is Forward Beta 
Inverse Capital Ratio 0.011 [5.8] 0.031 [20.8] 0.011 [9.2] 0.058 [27.4] 0.056 [23.5] 
Intercept 0.549 [18.6] 0.297 [12.4] 0.560 [31.3] 0.160 [7.2] 0.234 [11.2] 
Observations  59,316  59,316  59,316  59,316  59,316 
T  178  178  178  178  178 
Average R-Squared  0.015  0.032  0.006  0.072  0.036 
Panel B: Pooled with 2D Clustering, Dependent Variable is Forward Beta 
Inverse Capital Ratio -0.011 [-1.5] 0.019 [2.9] -0.003 [-0.4] 0.058 [8.0] 0.057 [5.9] 
Intercept 0.802 [9.6] 0.442 [5.3] 0.714 [7.5] 0.154 [2.3] 0.225 [2.8] 
Observations  59,316  59,316  59,316  59,316  59,316 
Average R-Squared  0.002  0.007  0.000  0.045  0.023 
Panel C: Fama-MacBeth, Dependent Variable is Forward RMSE (%) 
Inverse Capital Ratio 0.160 [7.7] 0.010 [0.5] 0.032 [1.2] 0.332 [11.0] 0.603 [13.4] 
Intercept 7.669 [22.6] 9.318 [24.5] 9.078 [20.9] 6.462 [27.5] 4.656 [15.7] 
Observations  59,316  59,316  59,316  59,316  59,316 
T  178  178  178  178  178 
Average R-Squared  0.028  0.013  0.019  0.024  0.036 
Panel D: Pooled with 2D Clustering, Dependent Variable is Forward RMSE (%) 
Inverse Capital Ratio -0.059 [-0.8] -0.103 [-1.6] -0.091 [-1.1] 0.363 [4.6] 0.678 [6.3] 
Intercept 10.101 [11.0] 10.720 [12.4] 10.436 [10.9] 6.176 [9.3] 4.061 [5.2] 
Observations  59,316  59,316  59,316  59,316  59,316 
Average R-Squared  0.001  0.002  0.001  0.017  0.030 
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Table 5. Returns and Beta: Fama-MacBeth Regressions. Regressions of excess returns on pre-ranking beta and 
other deciles. Pre-ranking beta, market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, past returns, and the sample are 
described in Table 2. 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Excess Return (Basis Points) Univariate Multivariate 
 Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] 
Pre-Ranking Beta Decile -0.5 [-0.19] 0.8 [0.33] 
Log (Market Capitalization ($M))   -2.1 [-0.45] 
Book-to-Market Ratio Decile   11.4 [5.95] 
Return from t-12 through t-2 (%) Decile   15.3 [6.72] 
Intercept 63.9 [3.98] -65.4 [-1.05] 
Observations  272,031  207,267 
T  486  486 
Average R-Squared  0.0203  0.0676 
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Table 6. Realized Returns and Risk: Beta Portfolios. Regressions of portfolio returns on market excess returns 
and the Fama-French factors, SMB and HML. Each portfolio total return in excess of the riskless rate is computed 
using either equal or value weights. The sample is divided within each month into low (bottom 30%), medium 
(middle 40%), and high (top 30%) portfolios according to pre-ranking root mean squared error. Pre-ranking root 
mean squared error and the sample are described in Table 2. 
 
Panel A. Equal Weighted 
 Bottom 30% Middle 40% Top 30% Top – Bottom 
Basis Points Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] 
Mean Excess Returns 
 59.1 [3.42] 65.0 [2.90] 58.2 [1.93] -0.9 [-0.05] 
CAPM Regressions 
Market 0.56 [18.91] 0.81 [23.51] 1.14 [26.15] 0.59 [17.67] 
Intercept 33.6 [2.55] 28.0 [1.82] 5.9 [0.30] -27.7 [-1.86] 
T  486  486  486  486 
R-Squared  0.425  0.533  0.586  0.392 
Fama-French 3-Factor Regressions 
Market 0.55 [21.59] 0.80 [28.96] 1.15 [32.29] 0.60 [18.63] 
SMB 0.38 [10.46] 0.47 [11.74] 0.52 [10.24] 0.14 [3.08] 
HML 0.46 [12.04] 0.65 [15.50] 0.89 [16.48] 0.43 [8.71] 
Intercept 9.1 [0.82] -5.6 [-0.45] -38.3 [-2.44] -47.4 [-3.33] 
T  486  486  486  486 
R-Squared  0.602  0.716  0.743  0.460 
 
Panel B. Value Weighted 
 Bottom 30% Middle 40% Top 30% Top – Bottom 
Basis Points Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] 
Mean Excess Returns 
 52.2 [2.37] 56.1 [2.31] 36.4 [1.21] -15.8 [-0.71] 
CAPM Regressions 
Market 0.71 [19.17] 0.95 [28.87] 1.27 [35.73] 0.55 [12.93] 
Intercept 19.6 [1.17] 12.4 [0.84] -21.6 [-1.36] -41.2 [-2.14] 
T  486  486  486  486 
R-Squared  0.432  0.633  0.725  0.257 
Fama-French 3-Factor Regressions 
Market 0.72 [19.78] 1.00 [31.46] 1.32 [38.74] 0.60 [13.90] 
SMB 0.20 [3.78] -0.03 [-0.58] -0.13 [-2.62] -0.33 [-5.24] 
HML 0.46 [8.33] 0.59 [12.35] 0.69 [13.41] 0.23 [3.57] 
Intercept -1.9 [-0.12] -11.5 [-0.83] -47.9 [-3.18] -46.0 [-2.41] 
T  486  486  486  486 
R-Squared  0.492  0.684  0.762  0.291 
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Table 7. Realized Returns and Risk: Idiosyncratic Risk Portfolios. Regressions of portfolio returns on market 
excess returns and the Fama-French factors, SMB and HML. Each portfolio total return in excess of the riskless rate 
is computed using either equal or value weights. The sample is divided within each month into low (bottom 30%), 
medium (middle 40%), and high (top 30%) portfolios according to pre-ranking beta. Pre-ranking beta and the 
sample are described in Table 2. 
 
Panel A. Equal Weighted 
 Bottom 30% Middle 40% Top 30% Top – Bottom 
Basis Points Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] 
Mean Excess Returns 
 70.8 [4.23] 67.6 [3.05] 42.6 [1.35] -28.1 [-1.34] 
CAPM Regressions 
Market 0.64 [27.31] 0.82 [25.24] 1.03 [19.50] 0.39 [9.02] 
Intercept 41.3 [3.92] 29.9 [2.04] -4.8 [-0.20] -46.1 [-2.36] 
T  486  486  486  486 
R-Squared  0.607  0.568  0.440  0.144 
Fama-French 3-Factor Regressions 
Market 0.65 [29.55] 0.82 [31.52] 1.02 [24.28] 0.38 [9.95] 
SMB 0.17 [5.35] 0.43 [11.32] 0.80 [13.23] 0.63 [11.61] 
HML 0.42 [12.70] 0.67 [16.92] 0.91 [14.24] 0.49 [8.50] 
Intercept 22.0 [2.28] -3.8 [-0.33] -54.3 [-2.92] -76.3 [-4.56] 
T  486  486  486  486 
R-Squared  0.682  0.741  0.670  0.393 
 
Panel B. Value Weighted 
 Bottom 30% Middle 40% Top 30% Top – Bottom 
Basis Points Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] 
Mean Excess Returns 
 55.7 [2.26] 43.8 [1.56] 49.4 [1.42] -6.3 [-0.29] 
CAPM Regressions 
Market 1.02 [34.23] 1.16 [33.62] 1.32 [26.40] 0.30 [6.30] 
Intercept 8.9 [0.66] -9.2 [-0.60] -11.0 [-0.49] -19.8 [-0.94] 
T  486  486  486  486 
R-Squared  0.708  0.700  0.590  0.076 
Fama-French 3-Factor Regressions 
Market 1.08 [37.65] 1.21 [38.06] 1.34 [29.36] 0.26 [6.00] 
SMB -0.27 [-6.60] -0.03 [-0.69] 0.34 [5.20] 0.62 [9.86] 
HML 0.51 [11.67] 0.71 [14.72] 0.87 [12.57] 0.36 [5.52] 
Intercept -7.9 [-0.62] -38.1 [-2.71] -51.7 [-2.56] -43.9 [-2.29] 
T  486  486  486  486 
R-Squared  0.747  0.760  0.679  0.263 
Table 8. Realized Returns and Risk: Robustness. Regressions of portfolio returns on market excess returns and the Fama-French factors, SMB and HML. 
Each portfolio total return in excess of the riskless rate is computed using either equal or value weights. The sample is divided within each month into low 
(bottom 30%), medium (middle 40%), and high (top 30%) portfolios according to pre-ranking beta or pre-ranking root mean squared error. Pre-ranking beta and 
root mean squared error and the sample are described in Table 2. All portfolios are value-weighted. The first four pairs of columns use only bank stocks, while 
the last two pairs of columns use the full CRSP sample. 
 
 
Beta: Top-Bottom, 
Bank Stocks, July 
1971-December 2011 
Beta: Top-Bottom, 
Bank Stocks, January 
1931-December 2011 
Idiosyncratic Risk: 
Top-Bottom, Bank 
Stocks, July 1971-
December 2011 
Idiosyncratic Risk: 
Top-Bottom, Bank 
Stocks, January 
1931-December 2011 
Beta: Top-Bottom, All 
Stocks, July 1971-
December 2011 
Beta: Top-Bottom, 
All Stocks,  
January 1931-
December 2011 
Basis Points Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] 
CAPM Regressions 
Market 0.55 [12.93] 0.74 [18.59] 0.30 [6.30] 0.50 [9.47] 0.71 [19.47] 0.80 [37.92] 
Intercept -41.2 [-2.14] -44.6 [-2.10] -19.8 [-0.94] -24.8 [-0.87] -37.7 [-2.32] -35.3 [-3.14] 
T  486  972  486  972  486  972 
R-Squared  0.257  0.263  0.076  0.085  0.439  0.597 
Fama-French 3-Factor Regressions 
Market 0.60 [13.90] 0.64 [15.75] 0.26 [6.00] 0.18 [3.58] 0.63 [18.66] 0.70 [34.42] 
SMB -0.33 [-5.24] -0.13 [-2.05] 0.62 [9.86] 1.04 [13.05] 0.25 [5.19] 0.35 [10.69] 
HML 0.23 [3.57] 0.56 [9.73] 0.36 [5.52] 0.61 [8.51] -0.17 [-3.23] 0.15 [5.30] 
Intercept -46.0 [-2.41] -58.3 [-2.84] -43.9 [-2.29] -61.2 [-2.41] -32.3 [-2.16] -46.1 [-4.49] 
T  486  972  486  972  486  972 
R-Squared  0.291  0.320  0.263  0.273  0.540  0.671 
Table 9. Realized Returns and Risk: Bank Capital Portfolios. Regressions of portfolio returns on market excess 
returns and the Fama-French factors, SMB and HML. Each portfolio total return in excess of the riskless rate is 
computed using either equal or value weights. The sample is divided within each month into high (top 30%), 
medium (middle 40%), and low (bottom 30%) portfolios according to Tier 1 capital divided by total risk-weighted 
assets. Capital ratios, the sample, and the link between capital ratios and beta are described in Table 3. 
 
Panel A. Equal Weighted 
 High 30% Middle 40% Low 30% Low – High 
Basis Points Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] 
Mean Excess Returns 
 72.8 [2.53] 70.6 [1.99] 32.2 [0.69] -40.6 [-1.52] 
CAPM Regressions 
Market 0.54 [10.98] 0.65 [10.34] 0.81 [9.55] 0.27 [4.74] 
Intercept 46.4 [2.07] 39.1 [1.38] -7.1 [-0.19] -53.5 [-2.11] 
T  180  180  180  180 
R-Squared  0.404  0.376  0.339  0.112 
Fama-French 3-Factor Regressions 
Market 0.53 [13.74] 0.64 [12.30] 0.80 [10.48] 0.27 [4.91] 
SMB 0.39 [7.86] 0.42 [6.32] 0.33 [3.38] -0.06 [-0.81] 
HML 0.50 [9.68] 0.59 [8.56] 0.65 [6.35] 0.15 [2.02] 
Intercept 18.1 [1.03] 6.9 [0.29] -38.9 [-1.11] -57.1 [-2.26] 
T  180  180  180  180 
R-Squared  0.639  0.579  0.465  0.146 
 
Panel B. Value Weighted 
 High 30% Middle 40% Low 30% Low – High 
Basis Points Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] Coefficient [T] 
Mean Excess Returns 
 60.0 [1.28] 51.2 [1.01] 43.9 [0.76] -16.1 [-0.52] 
CAPM Regressions 
Market 1.02 [14.35] 1.06 [13.08] 1.24 [14.00] 0.22 [3.22] 
Intercept 10.5 [0.33] -0.1 [0.00] -16.3 [-0.41] -26.8 [-0.87] 
T  180  180  180  180 
R-Squared  0.536  0.490  0.524  0.055 
Fama-French 3-Factor Regressions 
Market 1.03 [16.01] 1.06 [15.25] 1.26 [15.94] 0.23 [3.52] 
SMB 0.13 [1.63] 0.17 [1.98] -0.10 [-1.03] -0.24 [-2.81] 
HML 0.56 [6.60] 0.73 [7.91] 0.63 [6.00] 0.07 [0.78] 
Intercept -12.9 [-0.44] -30.7 [-0.96] -35.4 [-0.98] -22.5 [-0.74] 
T  180  180  180  180 
R-Squared  0.630  0.626  0.626  0.114 
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Table 10. Theoretical Determinants of Changes in WACC. This table summarizes how the weighted average cost 
of capital depends on assumptions regarding the efficiency of the debt market, its integration with the equity market, 
and the existence of a government subsidy.  
 
Bank Debt  
Risk Pricing 
Integrated 
Markets Government Subsidy !WACC 
Risky Correctly 
Priced 
No No  
Risk Free Correctly 
Priced 
No No  
Risky Low Beta 
Anomaly 
No No 
 
Risky Low Beta 
Anomaly 
" = "d 
No No 
 
Risky or 
Risk Free 
Low Beta 
Anomaly 
" = "d 
Yes 
 
No 0 
Risky Correctly 
Priced 
No Yes 
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Appendix: Sample Bank Data. Example beta, RMSE, and Tier 1 capital ratio for select large and small 
capitalization banks as of December 2011. The first panel lists banks with greater than $5 billion in market 
capitalization. The second panel lists banks with market capitalization between $75 and $125 million. Pre-ranking 
beta is computed by regressing a minimum of 24 months and a maximum of 60 months of trailing holding period 
returns in excess of the riskless rate on the corresponding CRSP value-weighted market holding period returns 
(VWRETD, also in excess of the riskless rate). Pre-ranking root mean squared error uses the residuals from these 
regressions. The first measure of capital adequacy is the ratio of total equity capital (RCFD3210) divided by average 
total assets (RCFD3368). The second replaces Tier 1 capital (RCFD8274) in place of total equity capital and uses 
total risk-weighted assets (RCFDa223) in place of average total assets. The third uses total risk-based capital 
(RCFD3792) in place of total equity capital.  
 
  Risk Capital Adequacy (%) 
Bank Name 
Market 
Cap Beta 
RMSE 
(%) 
Equity 
to 
Assets 
Tier 1 
Capital 
to Risk-
Weighted 
Assets 
Risk-
Based 
Capital 
to Risk-
Weighted 
Assets 
Panel A. Large Capitalization Banks, Over $5 Billion 
CITIGROUP INC 122,000 2.42 14.52 11.20 15.09 16.91 
FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 9,516 2.13 15.79 14.34 13.18 15.17 
BANK OF AMERICA CORP 110,400 2.01 14.26 11.40 11.54 14.73 
AMERICAN EXPRESS CO 52,027 1.91 11.00 19.22 18.26 19.53 
CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP 17,011 1.65 11.73 15.29 11.94 16.31 
STATE STREET CORP 21,687 1.31 8.70 10.80 18.14 19.99 
WELLS FARGO & CO NEW 142,800 1.28 10.37 11.20 10.40 13.36 
GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP INC 79,825 1.24 8.46 19.22 18.87 23.94 
SUNTRUST BANKS INC 11,679 1.19 11.79 11.94 10.05 12.58 
P N C FINANCIAL SERVICES GRP INC 28,314 1.14 8.82 15.41 12.18 15.49 
MORGAN STANLEY DEAN WITTER & CO 37,005 1.14 12.26 12.17 16.70 19.49 
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO 146,200 1.08 8.06 8.40 9.71 13.59 
REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP NEW 6,758 1.01 13.27 11.92 11.68 14.93 
COMERICA INC 6,440 0.99 8.03 11.04 10.27 14.29 
U S BANCORP DEL 45,617 0.94 7.66 10.34 9.30 12.72 
B B & T CORP 16,095 0.87 10.79 11.23 13.02 15.48 
NORTHERN TRUST CORP 12,182 0.76 6.22 9.14 13.12 15.72 
M & T BANK CORP 9,187 0.69 8.62 13.24 8.82 12.43 
NEW YORK COMMUNITY BANCORP INC 7,318 0.68 6.57 14.40 13.51 14.18 
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORP 33,480 0.61 6.36 9.68 12.14 15.76 
KEYCORP NEW 6,630 0.53 11.16 10.54 12.41 16.52 
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  Risk Capital Adequacy (%) 
Bank Name 
Market 
Cap Beta 
RMSE 
(%) 
Equity 
to 
Assets 
Tier 1 
Capital 
to Risk-
Weighted 
Assets 
Risk-
Based 
Capital 
to Risk-
Weighted 
Assets 
Panel B. Small Capitalization Banks, $75 to $125 Million 
HERITAGE COMMERCE CORP 97 1.54 15.61 13.06 16.83 18.10 
FIRST BANCORP P R 77 1.05 19.07 7.63 10.28 11.57 
NORTHRIM BANCORP INC 121 1.02 7.68 11.94 13.11 14.36 
HERITAGE OAKS BANCORP 83 1.01 10.57 12.70 13.47 14.75 
HORIZON BANCORP IND 84 0.90 8.40 9.40 12.70 13.95 
ENCORE BANCSHRES INC 108 0.79 17.11 10.33 11.78 13.04 
SOUTHERN NATIONAL BANCORP VA INC 85 0.76 9.86 15.82 19.74 20.99 
MIDDLEBURG FINANCIAL CORP 97 0.70 7.74 8.40 12.28 13.54 
MIDWESTONE FINANCIAL GRP INC NEW 124 0.68 11.79 9.61 11.96 13.21 
ENTERPRISE BANCORP INC 106 0.62 6.77 9.04 10.11 11.42 
BAR HARBOR BANKSHARES 104 0.62 5.25 9.38 13.72 15.56 
N B & T FINANCIAL GROUP INC 78 0.60 5.28 10.30 15.44 16.31 
MONROE BANCORP 76 0.58 20.92 8.28 12.44 13.71 
PORTER BANCORP INC 121 0.56 9.05 11.30 12.79 14.72 
B N C BANCORP 80 0.53 7.53 8.34 11.19 13.01 
PREFERRED BANK LOS ANGELES 105 0.43 15.39 10.69 13.75 15.02 
OHIO VALLEY BANC CORP 78 0.38 7.62 8.71 12.16 13.41 
CHICOPEE BANCORP INC 76 0.32 3.27 13.35 16.14 17.11 
WILBER CORP 100 0.28 11.38 8.29 13.22 14.48 
B C B BANCORP INC 88 0.26 4.98 9.16 14.95 15.89 
NORWOOD FINANCIAL CORP 78 0.18 5.26 12.35 17.94 19.23 
CITIZENS HOLDING CO 87 0.17 8.90 8.96 14.82 16.07 
CENTURY BANCORP INC 85 0.15 8.36 6.23 12.43 13.61 
UNION BANKSHARES INC 80 0.15 4.25 9.21 13.90 15.10 
HINGHAM INSTITUTION FOR SVGS MA 89 0.04 4.72 7.20 11.61 12.72 
!
 
 
